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Contemporary Political Dynamics of Japanese Nationalism
Nakano Koichi
This essay examines why nationalism seems to be
on the rise in Asia and beyond at a time when
globalization is also becoming more salient,  by
focusing on the political dynamics that propelled
both changes in Japan in the post-Cold War era.
The more open and liberal type of nationalism
that  appeared  in  Japan  in  the  1980s  to  the
mid-1990s was followed by an abrupt revisionist
backlash  beginning  in  the  late  1990s.  This
illiberal,  authoritarian  turn  in  contemporary
nationalism  was  confirmed  and  accelerated
during  the  premiership  of  Koizumi  Jun’ichiro
(2001-06), when further neoliberal reforms were
simultaneously  implemented.  I  argue  that  the
New Right  transformation  of  Japanese  politics
–the  combined  ascendancy  of  economic
liberalism  and  political  illiberalism—is  the
driving  force  of  contemporary  nationalism  in
Japan.
Jingoism and Revisionism
According to annual surveys conducted by the
Cabinet  Office,  in  recent  years  negative
sentiments vis-à-vis China and South Korea have
risen sharply in Japan. The 2014 survey revealed
that 93% per cent of  the Japanese respondents
have negative  sentiments  towards  China,  as  it
appears to be a growing threat to Japan. The rise
took place in two stages, first in the mid-2000s,
during  the  government  of  Koizumi,  when  he
made annual pilgrimages to Yasukuni Shrine that
derailed bilateral  relations,  and then further in
the  early  2010s  as  tensions  rose  over  the
Senkaku/Diaoyu territorial  dispute  in  the  East
China Sea.
Regarding  Japanese  sentiments  vis-à-vis  South
Korea, there was a sharp drop in positive feelings
in  2012  as  bilateral  relations  deteriorated
following  President  Lee  Myung-bak’s  visit  to
Takeshima/Dokdo  islets  also  subject  to
competing claims of  sovereignty similar  to the
standoff with China, allegedly out of frustration
with  the  lack  of  progress  in  dealing  with  the
“comfort  women”  (the  women  who  were
subjected to sexual slavery in wartime military
brothels  at  the  behest  of  Japanese  military
authorities) issue. The same 2014 Cabinet Office
survey indicates that 66.4 per cent of  Japanese
harbor negative sentiments towards South Korea.
Considering  the  fact  that  negative  sentiments
against  China were consistently around 20 per
cent  until  the  June  4th  Incident  in  1989,  while
those against South Korea less than 40 per cent
until  as  recently  as  2011,  these  are  worrisome
developments  that  raise  concerns  about  the
future of Northeast Asia.
Moreover,  a  study  of  influential  conservative
monthly  magazines,  Shokun!  and  Seiron,  also
confirms similar trends of growing antipathy in
the media. Articles with titles that include such
words  as  han-nichi  (anti-Japan),  invariably  in
relation  to  China  and  Korea,  dramatically
increased in the late 1990s, and continued to rise
sharply  through  the  2000s  (Jomaru,  2011,
390-392).  The  popular  Manga  Ken  Kanryu
(Hating the Korean Wave Manga) published in
2005  broke  the  hate-mongering  taboo,  and
spawned  a  countless  number  of  similar
publications,  whose  principal  message  was
hatred of Korea and China. Today, sensationalist
books and magazines that fan anti-China and/or
anti-Korea  sentiments  have  become  an
alarmingly  ubiquitous  feature  of  Japanese
bookstores, and indeed, commuter trains, where
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the  adverts  of  populist  weeklies  persistently
exhibit  hate  messages  targeting  these  two
nations.
Zaitokukai Demonstrations Target ethnic Koreans in Japan
While there has been no violence or riots against
the Chinese or  the Koreans in Japan in recent
years,  hate demonstrations against the Zainichi
Korean  population  have  become  a  prominent
social issue, particularly since the establishment
of Zaitokukai (short hand for Zainichi Tokken o
Yurusanai  Shimin  no  Kai,  Citizens’  Group
Against Special Rights for Koreans in Japan in
2007. “Ordinary” Japanese, who previously were
content to consume hate-mongering publications
and spread jingoistic  messages  on the Internet
against  the  Zainichi  population  subsequently
took to the streets and spewed invective while
terrorizing ethnic Korean permanent residents of
Japan (Noma 2013; Sakamoto 2011). Zainichi are
targeted based on groundless beliefs that they are
accorded special privileges and because they are
the collateral damage of worsening relations with
South  Korea  over  unresolved  historical
grievances and clashing territorial claims, anger
over  North  Korea’s  abduction  of  Japanese
nationals ,  and  anxiet ies  generated  by
Pyongyang’s  missile  and  nuclear  weapons
program.
Secondly, there has been a spectacular ascent of
historical revisionism in mainstream politics and
media. The sharp rise in hate-mongering articles
in  conservative  media  mentioned  above  was
directly  triggered  by  reports  in  1996  that  all
Ministry  of  Education  approved  history
textbooks  for  use  in  junior  high  schools  from
1997 included references to “comfort women.” In
a  virulent  reaction  to  this  development,
revisionist  nationalists  in  politics  and  in  the
media  launched  an  organized  revisionist
counterattack.  Revisionists  champion  an
exculpatory and valorizing narrative of Japan’s
wartime actions and seek to revise the prevailing
mainstream  consensus  that  they  condemn  as
‘masochistic’  for  being  too  critical  of  Japan’s
conduct.
Thus, in January 1997, Tsukurukai (short hand
name  for  Atarashii  Rekishi  Kyōkasho  o
Tsukurukai, Japan Society for History Textbook
Reform)  was  launched  by  rightwing  media
figures and academics, while in February, the late
Nakagawa Shoichi and Abe Shinzo led a group
of  junior  revisionist  politicians  to  launch  the
Young  Parliamentarians  Association  that
Consider Japan’s Future and History Education,
and in  May,  Japan Conference (Nippon Kaigi)
was established as a powerful lobby group that
brought together neonationalist intellectuals and
business  leaders  with  the  religious  right
(Shintoist  groups  as  well  as  new  religions).
Nippon Kaigi also has a parliamentary arm with
members  mostly  hailing  from  the  Liberal
Democratic  Party  (LDP),  the  party  that  has
dominated  Japanese  politics  since  it  was
established  in  1955.  This  flowering  of  the
revisionist movement on multiple fronts came to
a head in 1997. From the very beginning, such
rightwing/conservative media conglomerates as
Fuji-Sankei group (that publishes Seiron as well
as Sankei newspaper) and Bungei Shunju (that
used to publish Shokun! among others) provided
a  media  platform  for  these  concerted  efforts
(Tawara 1997; Sasagase et al 2015; McNeill 2015).
Although  serious  scholars  in  the  late  1990s
dismissed revisionist claims as baseless, and in
conflict with available evidence, by the time Abe
succeeded Koizumi as Prime Minister in 2006, all
reference to the “comfort women” disappeared
from the main texts of the government-approved
textbooks.
One  key  point  that  needs  to  be  made  at  this
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juncture is that these two phenomena—jingoism
and  revisionism—are  essentially  elite-driven
processes  rather  than  reflecting  grassroots
sentiments or public opinion. Political and media
elites  took  the  lead  in  fanning  negative
sentiments  against  Japan’s  neighbors,  often,  of
course, in response to what they considered to be
provocations  by  their  Chinese  and  Korean
counterparts.  However,  when  we  look  at  the
chronology of these developments, it is evident
that xenophobia among the Japanese people was
instigated by the political and media elites
While it  is  entirely appropriate to ask in what
sense  the  “top-down”  xenophobia  (anti-China
and  anti-Korea  sentiments  in  particular)  and
historical  revisionism discussed here  constitute
“nationalism,” these are clearly worrisome trends
that stoke risings tension between Japan and its
East  Asian  neighbors,  where  anti-Japanese
sentiments  are  a  touchstone  of  “nationalism.”
Revisionists seek to rehabilitate the inglorious
wartime past
Neo/liberal Path to Nationalism
The rise of contemporary nationalism since the
late  1990s  is  all  the  more  curious  once  we
consider how it all came about in the first place.
After all,  Japan was seemingly set on a steady
path  to  neoliberal  internationalism  since  the
1980s.1 (#_ftn1)
When the  Basic  Treaty  with  South  Korea  was
signed in 1965, the Joint Communiqué noted the
“regrets”  (ikan)  and  “deep  remorse”  (fukaku
hansei)  expressed  by  the  Japanese  side  and
similarly,  when  diplomatic  ties  between  the
People’s  Republic  of  China  and  Japan  were
established in 1972, the Joint Communiqué stated
that,  “The Japanese side is keenly conscious of
the  responsibility  for  the  serious  damage  that
Japan caused in the past to the Chinese people
through  war,  and  deeply  reproaches  itself”
(sekinin  wo  tsukanshi,  fukaku  hansei  suru)
(Hattori 2015, 9-10; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan 1972).
While  leaders  of  the  countries  at  the  time
considered  these  expressions  sufficient  and
appropriate, the issue of war memory gained in
salience  and became a  diplomatic  issue in  the
shape of  the  history textbook controversy that
erupted  in  1982  over  alleged  changes  in  the
wording of Japanese descriptions of its invasion
of  China  (that  turned  out  to  be  incorrect).  In
response,  Japan  issued  the  1982  Miyazawa
Statement on History Textbooks by Chief Cabinet
Secretary Miyazawa Kiichi noting that the “spirit
in  the  Japan-ROK Joint  Communiqué  and  the
Japan-China Joint Communiqué naturally should
also be respected in Japan’s school education and
government  textbook  authorization.  Recently,
however,  the  Republic  of  Korea,  China,  and
others have been criticizing some descriptions in
Japanese  textbooks.  From  the  perspective  of
building  friendship  and  goodwill  with
neighboring  countries,  Japan  will  pay  due
attention to these criticisms and make corrections
at  the  Government’s  responsibility”  (Chief
Cabinet  Secretary  of  Japan  1982).
This  led  to  the  adoption  of  the  so-called
“neighboring countries” clause in the Ministry of
Education  criteria  for  textbook  approval  that
stipulates  that  “due  consideration  should  be
made  from the  point  of  view of  international
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understanding  and  international  cooperation
when dealing with  modern history  issues  that
involve  neighboring  Asian  countries.”
Improvements have since been made in history
textbooks, but in contemporary Japan this clause
is hotly contested by the revisionist right; by 2015
PM Abe has all but abandoned it.
On August 15, 1985, marking the 40th anniversary
of the end of the Second World War, then Prime
Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro paid an official visit
to the Yasukuni Shrine. The Chinese government
protested his visit, noting that the Class-A war
criminals that were found guilty of orchestrating
Japan’s rampage in Asia are enshrined there. By
1986, Nakasone decided to suspend future visits
to  the  shrine  in  consideration  of  the  Chinese
criticisms and subsequently admonished Prime
Minister Koizumi not to visit, arguing that doing
so undermines national interests.
What  is  crucial  to  understand  here  is  that
Northeast  Asia,  and indeed,  the  whole  world,
was going through a period of liberal opening in
the 1980s as the Cold War was nearing its end.
China  embarked  on  its  extensive  economic
reforms  in  1978,  and  they  were  further
accelerated  by  the  mid-1980s.  This  led  to  a
somewhat more pluralistic society and political
leadership—a  country  that  was  now  rather
different from the time when Mao Zedong and
Zhou  Enlai  held  power.  Similarly,  the
democratization  movement  was  flaring  up  in
Korea throughout the 1980s, resulting in the June
29 Declaration of democratization in 1987, as the
military dictators lost their grip on power. Even
in the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev came to
power  in  1985  and  began  the  process  of
perestroika  (restructuring)  and  glasnost
(opening,  transparency)  that  ushered  in  the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. China, however,
crushed  the  Tiananmen Square  pro-democracy
movement  in  1989  as  its  leaders  resorted  to
violence  in  a  bid  to  prevent  a  Soviet-type
scenar io ,  deny  popular  demands  for
representative  government  and  preserve  the
communist  party’s  monopoly  of  power.  These
developments indicate that even in authoritarian
regimes, the government was no longer able to
fully  control  popular  demands  and  address
public  concerns,  and  that  their  polities  were
becoming more pluralistic, and thus, less stable.
It was in this context that Japan under Nakasone
was  also  pushing  through  neoliberal  reforms
with the professed ambition to play a stronger
leadership  role  in  the  liberal  economic  order.
Japan was  part  of  the  1985  Plaza  Accord that
triggered  the  rapid  appreciation  of  the  yen
(which in turn unleashed the bubble economy in
Japan),  and  a  key  participant  in  the  Uruguay
Round of multinational trade negotiations since
1986.  Following  the  June  4th  Incident,  Japan
joined the western sanctions against China, but it
also became the first country to lift them, with
Prime Minister Kaifu Toshiki visiting Beijing in
1991, followed by the Emperor’s visit in 1992.
Beyond the economy, the 1990-91 Persian Gulf
Crisis  tested  Japan’s  liberal  internationalist
orientation  as  Iraq  invaded  Kuwait.  Japan’s
“checkbook diplomacy,” contributing $13 billion
towards the coalition campaign but committing
no troops,  drew U.S.  criticism for  ducking the
risks of combat due to constitutional constraints
on  its  military  forces.  As  the  Cold  War  was
coming to an end, there was growing pressure
from the U.S. and its European allies for Japan to
play a leadership role not merely in the global
economy,  but  also  in  the  security  arena.
Overcoming  strong  political  opposition,  the
government  succeeded  in  enacting  the
Peacekeeping  Operation  Law in  1992  allowing
the dispatch of military forces in UN-sanctioned
peacekeeping efforts.
Japanese political leaders at the time, including
the  nationalist  Nakasone,  thought  that  Japan’s
prestige would benefit significantly from military
normalization.  They  also  understood  that
reconciliation with the former victims of Japan’s
militarist  past,  most  particularly,  China  and
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South  Korea,  was  an  absolute  prerequisite  to
realize those ambitions. This is why they were
prepared to go a long way in trying to come to
grips with the past. It is possible to say that even
ardent nationalist sentiments during this period
displayed distinctly liberal characteristics.
Thus,  when the first  victim of  Japan’s comfort
women  system  appeared  in  front  of  the  TV
cameras in 1991 calling for the Japanese state to
assume  its  responsibility,  the  government
conducted an investigation including interviews
with former comfort women that led to the 1993
Kono Statement (Kono Yohei was Chief Cabinet
Secretary  of  Japan  in  1993)  and  subsequently
established the Asian Women’s Fund in 1995 to
provide redress to these aging victims. Also in
1993, Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro became
the  first  Japanese  prime  minister  to  publicly
acknowledge that Japan was engaged in a “war
of  aggression”  in  the  Second  World  War
(Hosokawa 2010, pp. 30-31). This liberal trends
regarding war responsibility  culminated in the
Murayama Statement of 1995 acknowledging and
apologizing  for  Japanese  wartime  aggression
(Murayama  Tomiichi  was  the  socialist  Prime
Minister in 1995 in a coalition government with
the LDP).
Illiberal, Revisionist Turn
The liberal  opening up of societies around the
world continued in the post-Cold War era, and it
seemed  as  if  the  vexing  history  issues  that
emerged were going to be resolved by the same
liberal  political  elites.  Liberalization of political
systems, however, also meant that liberal elites
were no longer in full control of social demands,
or in fact, even of government policies. The quest
for international reconciliation over history issues
turned into an unpredictable process involving
multiple actors that are not neatly divided across
national lines. As mentioned in section 1 above,
certain  political  and  media  elites  manipulated
anti-China/anti-Korea sentiments and historical
revisionism for their own purposes from the late
1990s. Indeed, nationalists’ grandstanding in the
late 1990s onward has intensified tensions across
borders, reinforcing nationalist discourse in their
respective countries at the expense of moderates.
Several different factors coalesced to further the
illiberal,  revisionist  turn.  First,  after  more than
fifty years since WWII, the late 1990s saw a rapid
generational turnover among political elites, with
those with direct personal experience of the war
replaced  by  younger  politicians  with  no  such
experience who were building political careers in
the post-Cold War era  in  which there  was no
apparent rival ideology to neoliberalism. In many
cases, they were also born and raised in privilege
as hereditary scions of political dynasties. These
new elites often opposed expressions of war guilt
and contrition, and disavowed the reconciliation
initiatives of previous generations. They are also
prone to exhibit a rather more cynical, neoliberal
worldview,  according  to  which  self-interested
actors vie to get  ahead at  the expense of  each
other in domestic politics as well as international
relations.
Tellingly, while Miyazawa in 1991 was the first
postwar prime minister to hail from a political
dynasty  (he  had  also  served  as  an  elite
bureaucrat like many of his predecessors), since
1996 to date no less than seven of the ten prime
ministers came from political dynasties.2 (#_ftn2)
The  oligarchic  tendency  becomes  even  more
striking when one considers the fact that of these
hereditary prime ministers, Abe, Fukuda Yasuo,
Asō Tarō, and Hatoyama Yukio are, in fact, sons
or grandsons of postwar prime ministers. While
not  all  of  the  hereditary  politicians  share  a
revisionist  outlook,  their  predominance,
particularly  at  the  very top,  does  point  to  the
emergence of a privileged ruling class. In fact, it
is  highly  ironic  that  in  Northeast  Asia,  where
“nationalism”  has  raised  regional  tensions  to
unprecedented levels,  Japan and its  neighbors,
China,  South  Korea,  and  North  Korea,  are  all
currently led by hereditary politicians.
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Significantly,  the  rightward  political  shift  in
Japan in the 21st century coincides with economic
decline,  creating a  volatile  context  for  a  rising
tide  of  nationalism.  Japan  faces  prolonged
economic  stagnation,  relative  decline,  and
mushrooming  public  debt,  in  addition  to
growing disparities between rich and poor that
undermine the norms and values that have been
a  foundation  of  postwar  national  cohesion.  In
other words, the oligarchic political tendency is
also evident in the economic sphere, in a country
known for, and proud of, its egalitarian society.
Insecurity and precarity hit  the lower strata of
society  and  youth  especially  hard,  leading  to
increased  suicide,  divorce,  non-marriage,
deflation and lower productivity because firms
no longer invest in training disposable workers.
In this acute social crisis, political leaders sought
to divert attention to “external enemies.”
A poster for the Rally Against Precarity
Again,  on  this  front  Japan  was  not  alone  or
unique,  as  the  predominance  of  neoliberal
economic  policies  everywhere  meant  that  the
social  fabric  was  torn  apart  as  oligarchic
governments often lacked the fiscal resources, or
indeed  political  will,  to  ensure  minimum
standards of  national  wellbeing.  “Nationalism”
or xenophobic campaigns provided a “no-cost”
alternative  to  provision  of  adequate  social
security, enabling the ruling elites to dodge their
responsibilities and offer a false sense of national
unity  that  elided  the  marginalization  and
expansion  of  the  “have-nots.”  As  Dr.  Samuel
Johnson  famously  remarked  as  early  as  1775,
patriotism is ‘the last refuge of a scoundrel’ while
in  contemporary  Japan  i t  const i tutes
conservatives’ palliative for what ails the nation.
Last,  but  not  least,  these  processes  were
accelerated by neoliberal  internationalist  policy
orientation that we noted earlier. There are four
key elements in this process. First, since the First-
Past-The-Post  (FPTP)  electoral  system  was
introduced  in  1994,  the  LDP  became  a  much
more  centralized  party.  Diversity  of  internal
opinions  that  used  to  moderate  (or  dilute,
depending on one’s  point  of  view) the overall
party  stance,  and  thus,  offered  a  thriving
environment  for  consensus-seeking  moderates,
was  replaced  by  the  predominance  of
uncompromising  conservatives  with  extreme
views. Second, electoral system reform was soon
followed  by  administrative  reform  that
centralized power in the prime minister’s office.
This confluence of developments facilitated the
emergence of a “top-down” style of governance
that  was  inspired  by  the  neoliberal,  corporate
model.  Third,  electoral  system reform and the
party realignment that ensued brought about the
demise  of  the  Left,  namely  the  Japan Socialist
Party, that used to provide effective opposition
and  served  as  a  check  on  the  reactionary
inclinations  of  LDP  governments.  When
Murayama, the Socialist prime minister, stepped
down in 1996,  moderates in the LDP also lost
their  pivotal  position  in  the  evolving coalition
politics. Fourth, by 1998, it became evident that
the new main rival for the LDP-led government
was  the  neoliberal  Democratic  Party  of  Japan
(DPJ); overall, these rivals for power occupy the
same  ideological  niche.  After  Prime  Minister
Obuchi  Keizō  failed  to  spend  his  way  out  of
economic stagnation, a new neoliberal consensus
emerged between the DPJ and Koizumi’s  LDP
that signaled the beginning of an era of ideational
politics. This marked the end of the era of interest
politics  in  Japan,  when  the  government  had
ample  resources  to  satisfy  its  supporters  and
silence  opponents.  The  ideas,  ideologies,  and
identities  that  the  LDP  would  effectively
mobilize  in  the  new  era  were  nationalistic,
revisionist, and even xenophobic to a degree.
The late 1990s thus served as a transition period
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when these  changes  in  the  illiberal,  revisionist
direction were emerging, but it was not until the
2000s  under  Koizumi  that  these  changes
accelerated.
Xenophobia, Revisionism, and Authoritarianism
under Koizumi and Abe
While  there  is  no  denying  Koizumi’s  strong
charisma  and  mastery  of  political  theatrics,  it
would be a mistake to overlook the institutional
underpinning  that  was  put  into  place  by  his
predecessors  in  analyzing  the  sources  of  his
effectiveness as a political leader. Koizumi was
fortunate in being able to make use of the newly
concentrated power afforded him as the leader of
the LDP and as prime minister  to marginalize
critics,  promote loyal followers,  and propel his
agenda.  His  neoliberal  agenda  of  “structural
reform with  no  sacred  cows”  was  not  always
popular within the party, but he shrewdly made
up for it by fanning and exploiting “nationalistic”
sentiments.  His  annual  visits  to  the  Yasukuni
Shrine were a case in point. There is no record of
interest on his part in Yasukuni before or after he
served  as  prime  minister  (unlike  Abe,  who
deeply  cares  about  it).  Koizumi  nevertheless
claimed  that  the  visits  were  a  matter  of  his
“heart”  and  dismissed  Chinese  and  Korean
criticisms  as  domestic  interference.  He  thus
shrewdly invoked nationalist symbols to appear
as a resolute leader and advance his economic
program,  a  marked  contrast  to  PM Abe  who
invokes economic reform to divert criticism from
his revisionist agenda targeting wartime history




follow him to Yasukuni Shrine
The  hardcore  nationalists,  who  disliked
Koizumi’s  privatization  and  deregulation
reforms  that  they  viewed  as  a  sellout  to  U.S.
corporate interests, nevertheless cheered him as
he stubbornly refused to cave in to Chinese and
Korean  criticisms  and  continued  to  visit
Yasukuni  (Nakano  2006,  403).  The  New Right
technique Koizumi employed replicates Margaret
Thatcher’s mobilization of nationalist support for
the  Falklands  War  when  her  monetarist
economic  policies  were  proving  deeply
unpopular  in  the  early  1980s.  Ultimately,  as
Koizumi’s  signature  reform  project  of  postal
privatization encountered stiff  opposition from
within  the  LDP,  he  took  the  unusually
authoritarian  route  of  firing  uncooperative
ministers  from the  cabinet,  expelling  from the
party Diet members opposed to his scheme, and
called  a  snap  election  for  the  lower  house  to
counter  the upper house’s  rejection of  his  bill.
Such a move on his part would not have been
possible without the centralized power conferred
on  him  by  the  political  and  administrative
reforms of the 1990s.
One should note here also that under Koizumi
there  was  a  decisive  shift  away  from  the
internationalist  foreign  policy  orientation  that
Japan  adopted  since  the  1980s.  The  Koizumi
premiership  in  Japan  overlapped  with  the
presidency of George W. Bush in the U.S. In a
striking departure from prevailing assumptions
that  Japan  needs  to  reconcile  with  China  and
Korea  as  a  pre-condit ion  for  mi l i tary
normalization, Koizumi even went so far as to
claim that “There is no such thing as U.S.-Japan
relationship  that  is  too  close.  Some  people
maintain  that  maybe  we  should  pay  more
attention  to  other  issues  and  that  it  would
probably be better to strengthen relations with
other countries. I do not share such views. The
U.S.-Japan relationship, the closer, more intimate
it  is,  the  easier  it  is  for  us  to  establish  better
relations  with  China,  with  South  Korea,  and
other nations in Asia” (Prime Minister of Japan
2005).  The  Bush  Administration  perceived
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Koizumi’s  instrumental  use  of  revisionism  as
“healthy nationalism” allowing Japan to assume
a  greater,  if  subordinate,  military  role  in  the
alliance framework, damaging the prospects for
reconciliation with its former victims.
Given  the  loss  of  economic  opportunities,
however,  the  Japanese  business  community
ensured  that  when  Koizumi  finally  stepped
down, his successor, Abe, would work to rebuild
Japan’s  ties  with  China  by  refraining  from
visiting  Yasukuni  Shrine.  Abe  duly  acted
pragmatically at the time (though he later said
that he regretted not having visited Yasukuni as
prime minister), and in any case, his first stint at
the  premiership  lasted  only  for  a  year  as  he
suffered  a  humiliating  upper  house  election
defeat in 2007 at the hands of the then ascendant
DPJ. Within that year, however, Abe changed the
Basic  Law  on  Education  to  include  “love  of
country” as a goal  of  education,  upgraded the
Defense Agency to a full-fledged ministry, and
set  the  rules  for  conducting  an  eventual
referendum  for  constitutional  revision.
When Abe returned to power in December 2012,
he  faced  a  rather  different  set  of  political
conditions. The rival DPJ suffered a catastrophic
defeat, while there were a couple of new parties
that were positioning themselves even further to
the right of the LDP on many issues and were
indeed  willing  to  collaborate  to  advance  this
agenda. Abe also successfully silenced potential
dissent from big business by giving a boost to
stock  prices  with  the  reflationary  policies  of
“Abenomics,”  devaluing  the  yen  to  make
Japanese  exports  more  competitive,  and
advocating  restarts  of  Japan’s  idled  nuclear
reactors.
Abe also gained the enthusiastic backing of the
Sankei and Yomiuri newspapers, which acted as
media cheerleaders for his policies and pit bulls
for  his  critics.  Having  suffered  from  negative
media  coverage  in  his  first  premiership,  Abe
sought to tighten his grip on the media, placing a
trusted henchman with no media experience as
the head of Japan’s flagship public broadcaster,
NHK.
Once the upper house election of summer 2013
was out of the way, with a handsome victory for
Abe’s ruling coalition, he revealed his true colors
by  setting  up  the  National  Security  Council,
pushing  through  the  highly  controversial
Designated  Secrets  Law  that  gave  largely
unchecked  discretionary  power  to  government
officials to designate documents as state secrets,
and visiting Yasukuni  Shrine  on the  first  year
anniversary of  his  second premiership.  In July
2014, he further revised the official government
interpretation of the constitution to enable Japan
to exercise the right of collective self-defense by a
mere  cabinet  decision  –  something  that
successive  postwar  LDP  governments  had
repeatedly  acknowledged  would  require
constitutional  amendment.
The  prospects  for  revis ion  have  been
strengthened by Abe’s 2016 electoral victory, but
there  are  no  longer  doubts  about  Abe’s  real
agenda as Abenomics increasingly seems to have
promised  more  than  it  has  delivered  and,
because its main success is boosting stock market
prices,  critics  dismiss  it  as  welfare  for  the
wealthy. Abe has also tried to position himself as
an advocate for womenomics, but here again the
rhetoric  exceeds  the  reality.  He  reshuffled  his
cabinet in September 2014 with his media spin
masters emphasizing the record number of five
women ministers (plus a woman policy chief for
the LDP)3 (#_ftn3), but nearly all of these women
politicians were better known for their far-right
revisionist  views than for  their  feminist  policy
orientation.  Indeed,  Yamatani  Eriko  (National
Police  and  Disaster  Management  Minister),
Takaichi  Sanae  ( Internal  Af fa i rs  and
Communications Minister),  and Inada Tomomi
(LDP Policy Chief), in particular, were notorious
for  their  anti-feminist  and  extreme  revisionist
views, in addition to dubious ties to Neo-Nazi
and/or xenophobic activists.
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The revisionists  launched orchestrated,  vitriolic
attacks in 2014 against the liberal-leaning Asahi
newspaper after it retracted a handful of articles
on  the  “comfort  women”  from the  1990s  that
were based in part on false testimony. Abe also
seized  the  opportunity  to  attack  the  critical
newspaper  and  served  as  cheerleader-in-chief
even  as  emboldened  extremists  issued  death
threats against a university that employed one of
the former Asahi journalists who wrote some of
the “comfort women” stories that were not in fact
based on the false testimony. This McCarthyism-
style  campaign  by  reactionary  nationalists
threatens press and academic freedoms in Japan
while  intimidating  moderates.  (Uemura  with
Yamaguchi 2015).
When Abe called a snap election in December
2014 to consolidate his hold on power, the LDP’s
official campaign pledge included a passage that
said, “We shall act to restore Japan’s honor and
nat iona l  in teres t  by  present ing  f i rm
counterarguments  against  groundless
accusations based on falsehood through external
communication to the international community,”
a thinly veiled reference to its  plan to use the
Asahi retraction to challenge the consensus that
the “comfort  women” were sex slaves (Liberal
Democratic  Party  2014).  This  revisionist
campaign  aims  to  convey  the  misleading
impression that the whole of the sex slave system
was  an  Asahi  fabrication,  and  rewrite  Japan’s
shared history with  Asia  in  ways that  imperil
Japan’s regional interests.
Moreover,  Abe pursues this  revisionist  agenda
internationally,  as  Japanese  diplomats  in  New
York sought unsuccessfully to have McGraw-Hill
revise its description of the comfort women in an
American history textbook (Fackler  2015).  This
provoked a  public  relations  disaster  for  Japan
and publication of  a  letter  by a  group of  US-
based  historians  (including  eminent  scholars
such  as  Carol  Gluck  and  Sheldon  Garon)
expressing  “dismay  at  recent  attempts  by  the
Japanese government to suppress statements in
history textbooks both in Japan and elsewhere
about  the  euphemistically  named  ‘comfort
women’ who suffered under a brutal system of
sexual exploitation in the service of the Japanese
imperial  army  during  World  War  II”  in  the
newsmagazine  of  the  American  Historical
Association (Dudden et  al.  2015,  33).  Since the
U.S.  government  remains  firmly  opposed  to
revision  of  the  Kono  Statement,  Abe  and  his
supporters  have  conducted  hit-and-run  attacks
against it in the Diet to discredit this mea culpa
while denouncing the 1996 UN Coomaraswamy
Report on “comfort women” (UN Commission of
Human  Rights  1996).  Revisionists  are  thus
waging  a  campaign  to  deny  that  Japan  was
responsible  for  forced  recruitment  of  young
women and that the “comfort  women” system
constituted sexual slavery, again tarnishing the
dignity of the nation and its victims.
Choreographing Closer US-Japan Security Ties 2015
Abe’s  self-righteous  nationalism  and  strong
revisionist  streak  has  alienated  neighbors  and
made Washington increasingly abashed. Even if
the Pentagon thinks of Abe as their man in Japan
because  he  has  delivered  more  on  America’s
longstanding security requests  than the rest  of
Japan’s post-WWII prime minsters combined, he
is making himself an awkward partner because
nobody can pretend that shirking the burdens of
the  past  is  anything  but  narrow-minded  and
counterproductive nationalism.
This  article  is  adapted  from  Nakano  Koichi,
“Political  Dynamics  of  Contemporary  Japanese
Nationalism”  in  Jeff  Kingston,  ed.,  Asian
Nationalisms  Reconsidered  (Routledge,  2016).
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Notes
1 Neoliberalism refers to a set of “small government” policies, including privatization,
deregulation, elimination of trade barriers, and cuts in public expenditure, that generally result in
a widening gap between the rich and the poor.
2 Only Mori Yoshirō (who comes from a family of local politicians) in the LDP, and Kan Naoto
and Noda Yoshihiko from the Democratic Party of Japan served as prime ministers despite
lacking family connections in national politics. Abe is counted once even though he served on
two separate occasions, 2006-07 and 2012- present.
3 Koizumi’s first cabinet also had five women ministers.
